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January 1, 2004 marks the tenth anniversary of the North American Free Trade Agreement’s implementation. NAFTA promoters
— including many of the world’s largest corporations — promised it would create hundreds of thousands of new high-wage U.S.
jobs, raise living standards in the U.S., Mexico and Canada, improve environmental conditions and transform Mexico from a poor
developing country into a booming new market for U.S. exports. NAFTA opponents — including labor, environmental, consumer
and religious groups — argued that NAFTA would launch a race-to-the-bottom in wages, destroy hundreds of thousands of good
U.S. jobs, undermine democratic control of domestic policy-making and threaten health, environmental and food safety standards.
Why such divergent views? NAFTA was a radical experiment — never before had a merger of three nations with such different
levels of development been attempted. Plus, until NAFTA, “trade” agreements only dealt with cutting tariffs and lifting quotas
setting terms of trade in goods between countries. But NAFTA contained 900 pages of one-size-fits-all rules to which each nation
was required to conform all of its domestic laws — regardless of whether voters and their democratically-elected representatives
had previously rejected the very same policies in Congress, state legislatures or city councils. NAFTA required limits on the safety
and inspection of meat sold in grocery stores; new patent rules that raised medicine prices; constraints on local governments’
ability to zone against sprawl or toxic industries; and elimination of preferences for spending your tax dollars on U.S.-made
products or locally-grown food. Calling NAFTA a “trade” agreement is misleading, NAFTA is really an investment agreement. Its
core provisions grant foreign investors a remarkable set of new rights and privileges that promote relocation abroad of factories
and jobs and the privatization and deregulation of essential services, such as water, energy and health care.
Remarkably, many of NAFTA’s most passionate boosters in Congress and among economists never read the agreement. They made
their pie-in-the-sky promises of NAFTA benefits based on trade theory and ideological prejudice for anything with the term “free
trade” attached to it. Now, ten years later, the time for conjecture and promises is over: the data are in and they clearly show the
damage NAFTA has wrought for millions of people in the U.S., Mexico and Canada. Thankfully, the failed NAFTA model — a
watered down version of which is also contained in the World Trade Organization (WTO) — is merely one among many options.
Throughout the world, people suffering with the consequences of this disastrous experiment are organizing to demand the better
world we know is possible. But, we face a race against time. The same interests who got us into NAFTA are now pushing to
expand it and lock in 31 more countries in Latin American and the Caribbean through the proposed Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA) and five Central American countries through a Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). 
When NAFTA was being debated,a key argument madeboth in the U.S. and Mexico was that NAFTA
provided Mexico’s best path to bringing its standard of
living closer to that of its northern neighbors. Both
governments also promised border-area residents and
environmental groups that NAFTA would lead to improved
environmental conditions. Now, a decade later, the actual
results of the NAFTA model on Mexico can be reviewed.
Whether measured by the explosive rural crisis caused by
NAFTA; the government data showing horrifying levels of
poverty, increased economic inequality and NAFTA-related
environmental damage; or by the diversity of Mexican
workers and farmers united in their outrage about NAFTA,
it is obvious that NAFTA was harmful to Mexico.
Ten years of NAFTA has resulted in over 1.5 million
Mexican farm livelihoods destroyed as cheap U.S. corn was
dumped in Mexico, dropping prices paid to Mexican
farmers by 70%. Displaced rural workers have migrated to
Mexico’s overcrowded cities where underemployment and
unemployment have kept wages for scarce jobs low or
made the perilous journey to the U.S. to seek work, with
such migration more than doubling under NAFTA as
Mexico’s economy failed to create nearly enough jobs for
its workers.1 Despite this, NAFTA defenders often point to
Mexico’s increased exports to the U.S. and inflow of
foreign investment as evidence of success.Yet,NAFTA rules
forbade Mexico from adopting the policies that could have
harnessed these inflows to create permanent gains for the
Mexico’s economy. And while exports increased, the
average wage paid Mexico’s manufacturing workers
declined from $5 per day (which was not a living wage) to
only $4.
Regarding the environment and public health, not only
have promised improvements not been forthcoming, but
the increased industrialization of the border under NAFTA
has resulted in massive increases in toxics dumping and
water contamination. The NAFTA environmental side
agreements have proved useless in addressing the damage.
THE TEN YEAR TRACK RECORD OF THE




After living with NAFTA for ten years, many Mexicans now
realize that the Zapatistas — whose January 1, 1994
uprising was timed to coincide with NAFTA’s start date —
had a critique that applied beyond Mexico’s indigenous
peoples when they warned that “NAFTA is our death
sentence.”
AGRICULTURE, RURAL CRISIS
At NAFTA’s start date, nearly one quarter of Mexico’s active
labor force was involved in the agricultural sector — about
8 million people. Under NAFTA this number fell to
approximately 6.5 million by 2003.2 Much of Mexican
agriculture — and the backbone of Mexico’s rural economy
— consisted of campesinos who farmed small plots of land
(called ejidos) that were permanently deeded to Mexico’s
peasant farmers by the land reforms at the core of Mexico’s
post-revolution 1917 Constitution. In preparation for
NAFTA, Mexico was required to amend its Constitution to
allow foreign ownership of land.This undermined the ejido
system,allowing plots to be sold or, in most cases, seized by
creditors.NAFTA also required elimination of programs that
small farmers had relied on — price floor guarantees, low-
interest loans and subsidies for fuel and fertilizer.
Prior to NAFTA, corn was Mexico’s most important
crop, accounting for 60% of cultivated land with 3 million
producers.3 NAFTA lifted Mexico’s quotas (that allowed
corn imports only if local production did not meet national
needs) and transformed them into tariffs to be phased out
over 15 years. Under pressure from industrial interests
seeking access to cheaper corn, however, the Mexican
government chose to ignore the NAFTA timetable and
effectively liberalized the sector within three years instead
of 15. U.S. corn exports to Mexico have more than
quadrupled since 1993, and have been sold at prices below
what it cost U.S. farmers to grow it, causing in a 70% drop
in the real prices paid to Mexican farmers for their corn
under NAFTA.4
There has, however, been little incentive or possibility
for Mexican farmers to shift crops, with most continuing to
produce corn until they lost their land due to debt. The
subsequent decline in domestic production has left Mexico
increasingly dependent on importing its staple food —
corn. In 1996, the Mexican government reported that one
in five Mexican children suffered from malnutrition when
the U.S.corn crop was smaller than expected.5 If remaining
tariffs, including those on corn and beans, are completely
removed in 2008 as scheduled, many more Mexican farm
families will be displaced,with estimates running as high as
15 million,or about one in six Mexicans.6 Deprived of their
livelihoods, these displaced farmers have become
economic migrants, in search of scarce maquila jobs, or
making increasingly desperate efforts to cross the border
into the U.S. Over 1600 Mexican migrants have died
attempting to reach the U.S. since 1998.7
Contrary to free-trade economic theory, however,
Mexican consumers have not benefited from import
competition and lower farm prices.The prices of goods in
the basic food basket increased 257% during the NAFTA
era, while the prices paid to agricultural producers for all
goods combined rose only 185%.8 The price of the staple
food corn tortillas actually has risen since NAFTA — by 50%
in Mexico City and even higher in rural areas.9
Growing hunger and desperation about NAFTA’s rural
devastation has fuelled a new Mexican social movement
coordinated under the name “The Countryside Can’t Take It
Any More” (El Campo No Aguanta Más), and sparked
massive national protests that rocked the political
landscape in 2002 and 2003, including a takeover of the
Ciudad Juarez international bridge (halting U.S. imports),
and a march that brought over 100,000 to the capital’s
central Zocalo square on January 31, 2003.
INVESTMENT, EXPORTS HAVE NOT
BENEFITED THE BROADER ECONOMY
During the NAFTA debate, Mexicans were promised NAFTA
would dramatically increase trade and investment inflows
which would create better jobs, raise wages and lift millions
out of poverty. Ten years later, increased investment and
exports have not translated into the promised benefits.
Mexican government data show that net foreign direct
investment in Mexico rose under NAFTA from 1986-93
annual average of $3.46 billion to $24.73 billion in 2001.
Mexico had also become the world’s eighth-largest
exporter by 2002,yet still it ranked only 54th with regard to
human development indices.10 Despite the increased
investment and exports, Mexican per capita income only
grew at 9% under NAFTA, less than one-fifth of its growth
rate in the 1960s and 1970s.11
The vast majority of Mexican workers have not
benefited from NAFTA. Instead, the minimum wage, which
approximately 25% of the country’s 40 million workers
earn, has declined 20% and hovers at around $4/day. Half of
the workforce makes less than $8/day.12 The huge influx of
migrants from the collapsing rural economy and weak
economic growth under NAFTA has helped keep wages
stubbornly low, and failing to keep up with inflation, let
alone productivity gains. Attempts by Mexican workers to
unionize have been harshly — often violently — countered.
NAFTA’s empty shell of a labor side agreement has proved
useless.This reality, combined with the 1995 peso crash —
caused in part by the currency being artificially propped up
as part of the campaign to get NAFTA approved — has
meant real wages for most workers are well below their
pre-NAFTA levels.13 The Mexican government recently
estimated that over half of the population earns less than
what is required to cover the basics of food, clothing,
housing,health care,public transportation and education.14
Increased exports and investment have not produced
broader benefits, in part because of specific NAFTA
provisions limiting regulation of foreign investors. Thus,
Mexico became an “easy in, easy out” investment locale.
NAFTA’s investment terms forbade the Mexican
government from adopting policies, such as local content,
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export sales and technology transfer requirements, to foster
the development of a Mexican industrial base independent
of transient foreign investors. NAFTA’s investment rules —
which also form the core of the proposed FTAA — ensured
that when companies moved to cheaper locations there
would be few residual benefits. Fully one third of the
800,000 manufacturing jobs that the Mexican government
says were initially created under NAFTA have disappeared
as companies have raced downward to take advantage of
still cheaper labor in such countries as China, Malaysia and
Guatemala.15
NAFTA’s export-driven model benefited large
multinational corporations while generally decimating
small and medium-sized Mexican businesses, which not
only faced new competition from huge companies whose
Mexican operations enjoyed an array of rights and
privileges under NAFTA, but which also lost benefits from
assorted credit programs and procurement preferences
banned by NAFTA. The disappearance of these domestic
businesses essentially destroyed most of Mexico’s
“productive chains,” making the national economy
increasingly dependent on imported inputs and retail
goods.16
Export growth under NAFTA was largely concentrated
in the maquiladora manufacturing sector. Many of these
foreign-owned assembly plants provided state-of-the-art
facilities, yet the fancy new factories were built from
imported machinery and the companies that operate them
purchase less than 3%, on average, of their components and
packaging in Mexico.17 This near-total disconnection from
domestic industries is one of the major reasons why growth
in the maquiladora sector in the 1990s failed to create
long-term jobs or generally promote growth in the broader
economy. Small and medium-sized Mexican businesses that
survived the initial NAFTA shock were faced with a difficult
uphill struggle: between 1992 and 1998, the share of total
Mexican employment provided by micro, small and midsize
firms fell from 51 to 42.8%.18 Credit has also become a
problem for domestic businesses. As Mexico’s banking
system was bought up by foreign (largely U.S.) interests,
lending to Mexican business declined from 10% of GDP in
1994 to 0.3% in 2000.19 Meanwhile, NAFTA’s service sector
rules helped huge U.S. firms, such as Costco and Wal-mart
that undercut local businesses and rely heavily on foreign
suppliers, to dominate Mexico’s retail sector.
Ten years into NAFTA, some of the pact’s greatest
boosters have become its fiercest critics,creating the protest
group, El Barzón.These people once owned Mexico’s small
and medium-sized language, accounting and other services,
or its candy, shoe, toy and other manufacturing interests, but
have slipped from the middle class into poverty after losing
their businesses under NAFTA.
NAFTA’S ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
U.S. and Mexican government officials argued that
increased trade and investment under NAFTA would
generate wealth needed to clean up the environment.They
also argued that NAFTA would remove incentives for
concentrating industrial development along the U.S.-
Mexico border, dispersing environmental damage already
occurring there.
Now, ten years later, it is clear that NAFTA-related
business activity has increased air and water pollution and
generated tons of hazardous waste which is being dumped.
Instead of industrial development becoming more
dispersed throughout the country, it intensified along the
border, inflicting still more environmental degradation on
already heavily-polluted areas. During the NAFTA era, the
number of maquiladora factories nationwide more than
doubled from 1700 plants in 1990 to 3600 in 2001 — with
2700 plants located along the border by 2001.According to
Mexican government figures, the cost of NAFTA-related
environmental damage was an estimated $47 billion — in
1999 alone.20 Meanwhile, the institutions that were set up
to facilitate and fund environmental cleanup and protection
programs have proven themselves to be wholly inadequate
— leading the U.S. environmental groups that had
supported NAFTA in 1993 to reverse position.
Since NAFTA, spending on the environment in Mexico
has fallen 45% in real terms and plant-level environmental
inspections declined at a similar rate.21 Under Mexican law,
hazardous waste created by U.S. companies in the maquila
zones must be shipped back to the U.S. for treatment. 22 Yet
Mexico’s Institute of National Ecology calculated in 1997 that
only 12% of 8 million tons of hazardous wastes generated in
the maquila zones received adequate treatment and as little
as 30% is actually returned to the country of origin (typically
the U.S.).The only tool to monitor waste flows was the U.S.
government’s “Haztracks” database, but it was cancelled by
the Bush administration in 2003.
While Mexico’s general population increased 40%
between 1980 and 2000, the border population has more
than doubled.23 Mexico’s overcrowded border cities, have
struggled to meet their basic sewage and waste disposal
needs.The lack of adequate sewer systems means that water
sources are contaminated with garbage and human wastes.
The human costs of this growing environmental disaster
have been devastating. The rates of diseases related to
unsafe water (such as hepatitis A and shigellosis) and failed
public health infrastructure (such as tuberculosis) have
skyrocketed, with hepatitis A infection rates on the border
more than double the Mexican national rate.24
Contamination from toxic waste and industrial chemicals
has been linked to a startling concentration along the
border of clusters of high cancer rates, devastating birth
defects and lupus.Since NAFTA,new clusters of neural stem
birth defects, such as anencephaly and spina bifida, have
devastated families living in Matamoras and Piedras Negras
— adding to the unusual concentration of these rare birth
defects already clustered in other maquila towns.25
The new water projects and sewage treatment facilities
that NAFTA supporters promised in 1993 have been
hamstrung by the cumbersome rules of the institutions
ostensibly designed to fund them. The North American
Development Bank has an estimated lending capacity of
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almost $3 billion but by the end of 2001 had only doled out
$15 million, in large part because the impoverished
communities involved cannot raise the required equity
financing and user fees.26 Meanwhile, a 218% increase in
truck traffic (between 1991 and 2001) carrying goods
northward from Mexican assembly plants has contributed
to severe smog problems in the Tijuana-San Diego and
Cuidad Juarez-El Paso areas.27
Plus, NAFTA’s “Chapter 11” provisions have been used
to attack environmental and health policies. For example, a
California company, Metalclad, was awarded $15.6 million
in compensation from the Mexican government after it
claimed that its NAFTA investor rights were violated by the
municipality of Guadalcazar’s denial of a construction
permit. Metalclad wanted to build a toxic waste disposal
facility on a site which had been previously contaminated
with 20,000 tons of toxic waste. The community wanted
the area cleaned up and other conditions met before the
site was expanded. The Mexican company from which
Metalclad had purchased the site had been denied the same
permit — showing that this was not a case of
discrimination against foreign investors. The NAFTA panel
that heard Metalclad’s claim, however, did so behind closed
doors with the affected citizens and local governments
entirely excluded and with NAFTA investment rules — not
Mexican or U.S. law — applied.28
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